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Wasserman: “A Verdict Worthy of Confidence”

NOTE
“A Verdict Worthy of Confidence”: The
Weakening of Brady’s “Materiality”
Requirement in Missouri
State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60 (Mo. 2015) (en banc)

Robert Wasserman*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Reginald Clemons was convicted and sentenced to death for his
alleged participation in the brutal rapes and murders of two sisters at the Chain
of Rocks Bridge in St. Louis, Missouri. Over twenty years later, and after several unsuccessful appeals by Clemons, the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated
his convictions. The court found that the prosecution had failed to disclose
evidence to Clemons’s trial counsel that suggested that he may have given his
confession involuntarily. The court concluded that this evidence was sufficiently important that the prosecution’s failure to disclose it undermined confidence in the trial court’s verdict.
The court therefore held that the prosecution violated Clemons’s due process rights under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland. However, Brady and its progeny held that the prosecution’s failure to disclose evidence violates the defendant’s due process rights only where the undisclosed
evidence is material. For evidence to be material under Brady, there must be a
reasonable probability that its disclosure would have changed the outcome of
the defendant’s trial. This Note will argue that the court in Clemons erroneously applied the Brady doctrine because the undisclosed evidence was immaterial. The result of Clemons’s trial would have been the same even if the trial
court had suppressed his confession because the State’s evidence was overwhelming, and it simply did not need Clemons’s confession to convict him.
Because the allegedly undisclosed evidence was not material under Brady,
Clemons’s due process rights were not violated, and the court erred in vacating
his convictions.

*
Associate, Bretz & Young LLC. B.A. Liberal Arts, Thomas More College of Liberal
Arts, 2013; J.D., University of Missouri School of Law, 2016. Thanks to Professor
Ben Trachtenberg for his assistance throughout the writing process and to the editors
of the Missouri Law Review for their helpful comments and feedback during the editing
process.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On the night of April 4, 1991, sisters Julie and Robin Kerry took their
cousin, Thomas Cummins, to the Chain of Rocks Bridge in St. Louis to see a
poem they had painted on the bridge several years before.1 As they walked
east on the bridge, the cousins saw a group of four men approaching them.2
The four men were at first friendly, and the groups parted without incident.3
As the cousins continued to walk east toward the Illinois side of the bridge,
they heard the footsteps of the four men behind them.4 At that point, one of
the men grabbed Cummins by the arm, walked him away from the group, and
told him to lie facedown on the ground or be killed.5 The four men then took
turns brutally raping the Kerry sisters.6 Cummins stated that the men threatened to throw the Kerry sisters off the bridge if they resisted.7
While the assault was still going on, one of the men, who Cummins would
later identify as Reginald Clemons, approached Cummins, told him that he had
just raped his girlfriend, and asked him “how that felt.”8 Cummins replied that
she was his cousin, not his girlfriend.9 The man identified as Clemons then
walked Cummins toward an open manhole and instructed him to climb onto
the platform below, on which the Kerry sisters were already lying down.10 The
three cousins were then told to step down onto a concrete pier about three feet
below the platform.11 At this point, Cummins “saw an arm push Julie and then
Robin off the bridge.”12 One of the men, who Cummins later identified as
Antonio Richardson, told Cummins to jump from the pier, and he complied.13
Cummins swam to the surface of the Mississippi river and “briefly had contact
with Julie” but was unable to see her; he never saw Robin.14
Cummins somehow swam to the river bank and climbed up to a road at
around 2:00 a.m.15 He then flagged down a driver and told him “that his cousins had been raped, and that he had been thrown off the bridge.”16 Police later
arrived and questioned Cummins.17 When it became light outside, the police
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 66.
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discovered several items that the perpetrators had left on the bridge, including
“an unused condom, a used condom, a pen, some change, and a cigarette
butt.”18 They also found a flashlight engraved with “Horn I.”19 Julie’s body
was found in the river three weeks later near Caruthersville.20 Robin’s body
was never recovered.21
Officers took a statement from Cummins at 9:00 a.m., roughly seven
hours after he had been forced to jump into the river.22 The police became
skeptical about Cummins’s version of the events, and the investigation began
to focus on him as the prime suspect.23 The police then took a second statement
from Cummins, which was largely consistent with his first.24 Nevertheless, an
“incident report that purportedly summarized Mr. Cummins’ statements in the
second recorded interrogation[] materially mischaracterized his statements to
indicate” that he and Julie had been in a romantic relationship, and that he had
actually never jumped from the bridge but had only gotten wet when he entered
the river from the bank to search for the sisters.25
Cummins then agreed to submit to a polygraph test.26 When he was finished, the polygraph examiner informed Cummins that the test results indicated
he had been deceptive in his answers.27 Police officers then told Cummins’s
father that his son’s story did not make sense.28 Cummins’s father responded
by urging his son to be truthful with the officers.29 The police then interrogated
Cummins again.30 A police report purporting to summarize Cummins’s statements during that interrogation was prepared.31 The report indicated that Cummins had caused the deaths of the sisters after Julie rejected his sexual advances.32 Cummins would later testify that after his father had left the interrogation room, the interrogating officers screamed at him, threatened him, and

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id. at 66.
See id.
Id.
Id. As set forth more fully below, the police department’s manipulation of
Cummins’s statements was one of the many incidents of alleged police misconduct in
the investigation of the Chain of Rocks Murders. Id. at 66–69.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id. The majority opinion noted that “Cummins’ condition and the circumstances under which the polygraph was performed were such that its results should not
have been given any credence.” Id.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 66–67. The report stated that Cummins had tried to get Julie to have
sex with him. Id. at 66. When she refused, he became angry and shoved her; she then
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punched the back of his head several times.33 He claimed that despite this coercion, he never made the inculpatory statements that were attributed to him in
the police report.34 After he was cleared of any wrongdoing in connection with
the murders, Cummins would receive a $150,000 settlement from the City of
St. Louis for the abuse he suffered at the hands of the police.35
About the same time that the authorities charged Cummins with the murders, they “received a call from a woman who had seen a television news story
about the search for the owner of a black flashlight.”36 The woman told the
officers that the flashlight belonged to her family and “had been stolen a few
days earlier.”37 The information she provided eventually led police to one of
the men, Antonio Richardson, who, in turn, implicated Clemons and Marlin
Gray in the murders.38 The police then located Clemons who “voluntarily
agreed to give a recorded statement.”39 Clemons’s statement was consistent
with what Cummins had told the police.40
The police then located Gray, took him into custody, and interrogated
him.41 His statement also largely corroborated what Cummins had initially told
police, but he denied that he was in the manhole when the cousins were pushed
off the bridge.42 While Clemons was in custody, his attorney and family members noticed swelling and an abrasion on the right side of his face.43 The judge
presiding over Clemons’s case ordered that Clemons be medically examined;
the doctor who performed the examination determined that Clemons had soft
tissue swelling over the right side of his face.44 Both Clemons and Gray then
filed complaints with the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department Division
of Internal Affairs.45 They alleged that the officers had beaten them in the
interrogation room and that they provided their recorded statements only out
of fear of further abuse.46

lost her balance and fell off the bridge. Id. at 66–67. At that point, “he became hysterical and blacked out.” Id. at 67. Cummins believed Robin either then jumped into the
river to rescue her sister or was pushed off the bridge by Cummins. Id. The police then
announced that the murders had been solved and that they had definitively identified
Cummins as the perpetrator. Id.
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 67–68.
41. Id. at 68.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 68–69.
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id.
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Prior to trial, Clemons moved to suppress the statements he had provided
to the police on the ground that such statements were the product of police
coercion and brutality.47 He called several witnesses who testified that they
had observed swelling on the right side of Clemons’s face following his interrogation.48 The trial court, however, overruled his motion to suppress the confession, claiming that there was no credible evidence demonstrating how
Clemons had received his injuries, if he did in fact receive them.49
At Clemons’s trial, the State’s principal evidence consisted of Clemmons’s confession, the testimony of Cummins, and the testimony of Daniel
Winfrey, who had been identified as the fourth perpetrator at the bridge.50 Both
Cummins and Winfrey testified that Clemons had raped the Kerry sisters,
robbed Cummins, and had at least acquiesced in the group’s decision to throw
the cousins from the bridge.51 Clemons “did not testify on his own behalf, but
he did present witnesses who testified they observed Mr. Clemons’ bruised
face.”52 Clemons’s attorney was not allowed to argue in his closing statements
that police had coerced his confession by beating him because the court found
that there was insufficient evidence to support such a claim.53 The jury found
him guilty on two counts of first degree murder.54 At the penalty phase of the
trial, the jury found twelve aggravating circumstances and recommended two
death sentences.55
After his trial and sentencing, Clemons filed his first of many motions for
post-conviction relief.56 These motions principally revolved around his claim
that his confession should not have been admitted at trial because it was procured by means of physical force in violation of his due process rights.57 He
filed a writ of habeas corpus in a U.S. district court; that court denied relief on
his Fifth Amendment claim but vacated his death sentence on other grounds.58
47. Id. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (holding that “the use
of the confessions thus obtained [through force is] . . . a clear denial of due process”).
48. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 70.
49. Id. In Missouri, “the State has the burden of proving the ‘voluntariness’ of a
confession.” State v. Bradford, 262 S.W.2d 584, 586 (Mo. 1953). Further, “when there
is substantial conflicting evidence and the evidence is close, it is better to refer the issue
to the jury than to exclude the confession upon the preliminary hearing.” Id.
50. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 67, 70.
51. Id. at 70.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 71.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 72.
57. Id. This included a direct appeal and a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court of Missouri, as well as a writ of habeas corpus to a U.S. district court. Id.
58. See Clemons v. Luebbers, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1135 (E.D. Mo. 2002), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 381 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2004). The district court
ruled that the trial court had unconstitutionally excluded six people from serving as
jurors because they expressed discomfort with imposing the death penalty. Id. at 1107.
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The Eighth Circuit subsequently reversed the district court’s decision and reinstated Clemons’s death sentence.59 Clemons then filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Missouri on the basis of his “actual innocence.”60 The court then appointed a special master to examine the claims
made in Clemons’s petition in light of the evidence.61
When Warren Weeks learned of the special master proceeding, he contacted Clemons’s counsel.62 In a videotaped deposition, he testified that he had
been working as a bail investigator for the Missouri Board of Probation and
Parole.63 While serving in that role, he was responsible for interviewing prisoners and filling out pre-trial release forms, which included, among other
things, information about the prisoner’s “physical problems.”64 Weeks further
testified that during his interview of Clemons, he observed a bruise on
Clemons’s right cheek “between the size of a golf ball and a baseball.”65 He
testified that he had made a note of this in his pre-trial release form, but that he
later saw that his notation “had been scratched out and could not be read.”66
Weeks further testified that he was questioned by police and the prosecutor
handling Clemons’s case regarding the injuries that Weeks claimed he had observed, and that “he felt pressured not to say anything” about those injuries.67
In light of Weeks’s testimony, the special master determined that the State
had willfully suppressed evidence tending to exculpate Clemons in violation
of Brady.68 The special master further concluded that had Weeks’s testimony
been revealed, it may have resulted in the suppression of Clemons’s confession
on the ground that it had not been freely and voluntarily given.69 If the trial
court had suppressed Clemons’s confession, it may have “put the case in a different light so as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”70 The Supreme
Court of Missouri affirmed the special master’s findings and recommendation,
concluding that the State’s Brady violation had substantially prejudiced
Clemons’s defense and thus undermined the credibility of the verdict.71

59. Luebbers, 381 F.3d at 757.
60. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 72. In Missouri, “[a]ny person restrained of liberty

within this state may petition for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of
such restraint.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 91.01(b).
61. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 73.
62. Id.
63. See id. See also Petitioner’s Brief at 8, State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475
S.W.3d 60 (Mo. 2015) (en banc) (No. SC90197), 2013 WL 6975162, at *8.
64. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 73.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 73–74.
67. Id. at 74.
68. Id. at 75.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 88.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
For a confession to be admissible at trial, it must be given voluntarily.72
The Weeks evidence lent support to Clemons’s claim that he had given his
confession involuntarily. The Weeks evidence also served as the basis of
Clemons’s Brady claim. To understand the court’s decision in Clemons, it is
necessary that one understand both the voluntariness requirement, as well as
the requirements set out under Brady. This section will therefore examine the
voluntariness requirement and the evolution of the Brady doctrine.

A. The Voluntariness Requirement
In Brown v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the question of “whether convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and violence, are consistent with the due process of law required by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.”73 In that case, the defendants confessed to murdering a man only after they were “severely
whipped” and beaten “with a leather strap with buckles on it.”74 The Court
noted that in its description of the defendants’ confessions, “the transcript reads
more like pages torn from some medieval account than a record made within
the confines of a modern civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitutional government.”75
The Court held that a State may not substitute “[t]he rack and torture
chamber . . . for the witness stand.”76 The State may not “contrive[] a conviction resting solely upon confessions obtained by violence.”77 It concluded that
the State had elicited the defendants’ confessions through methods “revolting
to the sense of justice,” and that its use of those confessions at trial was therefore “a clear denial of due process.”78
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Mississippi, the prohibition against the prosecution’s use of a defendant’s involuntary confession has
been a bedrock principle of criminal procedure in America. In later years, the
Court would hold that a defendant need not suffer actual violence – “a credible
threat of physical violence” will suffice to render his confession involuntary.79
72. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 283 (1936) (“There was thus enough before the court when these confessions were first offered to make known to the court
that they were not, beyond all reasonable doubt, free and voluntary; and the failure of
the court then to exclude the confessions is sufficient to reverse the judgment.”).
73. Id. at 279.
74. Id. at 281–82.
75. Id. at 282.
76. Id. at 285–86.
77. See id. at 286.
78. Id.
79. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991).
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The Court has also expanded the doctrine by holding that a confession may be
involuntary if it is procured by means of psychological coercion.80 In short, if
a trial court finds that the defendant did not give his confession free of physical
or psychological coercion, actual or threatened, it will not allow the prosecution to use that evidence at trial, no matter how probative.81 Evidence bearing
on the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession can theoretically make the
difference between a guilty or innocent verdict, and its suppression by the prosecution may violate his due process rights under the Supreme Court’s Brady
jurisprudence.

B. Brady and Progeny
Brady v. Maryland was the first Supreme Court case holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence violates a criminal defendant’s
due process rights.82 In Brady, the petitioner and his companion, Boblit, were
each found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to death.83 Brady admitted his role in the murder but claimed that it was Boblit who had actually
killed the victim.84 His counsel admitted that “Brady was guilty of murder in
the first degree” but requested that the jury not impose the death sentence, as
he had not actually killed the victim.85 Brady’s counsel requested that he be
allowed to examine the extrajudicial statements made by his client’s accomplice.86 The State turned over several such statements but withheld Boblit’s
statement in which he admitted that it was he, not Brady, who had committed
the homicide.87
When Brady’s attorneys discovered that Boblit’s exculpatory statements
had been withheld by the prosecution, they moved for a new trial.88 The trial
court denied the motion, but the court of appeals ruled that the prosecution’s
suppression of those statements denied Brady due process of law, and it remanded the case solely on the issue of his punishment.89 The Supreme Court
of the United States agreed with the appellate court, holding that “suppression
of this confession was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”90 The Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of
80. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
81. See Brown, 297 U.S. at 284 (holding that an involuntary confession admitted

into trial is sufficient grounds for reversal).
82. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See also Bennett L. Gershman,
Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685, 686 (2006) (discussing the
“landmark decision”).
83. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 86. The Fourteenth Amendment states:
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evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”91 The Court then held that whether the
withheld evidence is “material either to guilt or to punishment” depends on
whether the “evidence[,] . . . if made available, would tend to exculpate [the
defendant] or reduce the penalty.”92
In a later case, the Supreme Court clarified the Brady materiality standard
and also addressed the question of whether potentially exculpatory material
needed to be turned over to the defense absent a request.93 In that case, the
defendant, Agurs, was tried for a murder she allegedly committed while staying
at a hotel with the victim, Sewell.94 Witnesses stated that they had heard Agurs
screaming, that they went to her hotel room, and that they discovered Agurs
struggling underneath Sewell, who was then bleeding from fatal stab wounds
inflicted by Agurs.95 Agurs argued at trial that Sewell had attacked her, and
that she had stabbed him in self-defense.96 She was convicted.97 Three months
later, her attorneys discovered that Sewell had a criminal record indicating a
violent character, and that the State had possessed this record during trial but
failed to disclose it to the defense.98 Agurs then moved for a new trial.99
The Court held that “there are situations in which evidence is obviously
of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to
be disclosed even without a specific request.”100 The Court then held that the
standard of materiality with respect to Brady disclosures must reflect the degree to which the failure to disclose casts doubt on the validity of the conviction.101 It stated that “if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that
did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.”102

No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
91. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
92. Id. at 87–88; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PERSPECTIVES 884 (4th ed. 2009).
93. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98–99, 107 (1976).
94. Id. at 99.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 100.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 110.
101. See id. at 112.
102. Id.
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In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether impeachment evidence, as distinguished from exculpatory evidence,
must be disclosed under Brady.103 The defendant, Bagley, was indicted in federal court on weapons and drug charges.104 Before his trial, Bagley had requested that the prosecutors handling his case turn over the names and addresses of the witnesses they intended to call, as well as any deals or inducements that had been promised to the witnesses in exchange for their testimony.105 The government responded by providing the names of its two principal witnesses who had been assisting in an undercover investigation of Bagley on behalf of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives.106
The information produced, however, did not include any deals that the government had struck with the two witnesses.107 The government disclosed no such
deals.108
Bagley was subsequently found guilty of the narcotics charges and not
guilty of the weapons charges.109 After his trial, Bagley submitted a request
for documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act regarding the agreements that the government had entered into with its principal witnesses in Bagley’s case.110 Those documents revealed that the witnesses had been compensated for their testimony.111 Bagley then moved to vacate his convictions, arguing that the government’s failure to disclose its witnesses’ compensation
prevented him from impeaching their testimony and thereby denied him a fair
trial.112
The Supreme Court first noted that there is no distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence in the context of alleged Brady
violations.113 It then clarified the materiality standard for non-disclosed evi103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 669 (1985).
Id.
Id. at 669–70.
Id. at 670.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 671.
Id. The pertinent rule states:

An inmate may make a request for access to documents in his or her Inmate
Central File or Medical File (including documents which have been withheld from disclosure during the inmate’s review of his or her Inmate Central
File pursuant to § 513.40) and/or other documents concerning the inmate
which are not contained in the Inmate Central File or Medical File. Staff
shall process such a request pursuant to the applicable provisions of the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552.
28 C.F.R. § 513.61 (2017).
111. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 671.
112. Id. at 671–72.
113. Id. at 676.
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dence as follows: “The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”114 Accordingly, the
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the suppressed evidence would have, with reasonable probability, affected the trial court’s verdict.115
In what Professor Joshua Dressler called the “most recent pronouncement
on the discovery issue,”116 the defendant in Smith v. Cain was charged with
murdering five people during an armed robbery.117 At his trial, a single witness
identified Smith as the perpetrator.118 Smith was subsequently convicted on
five counts of first degree murder.119 Smith then moved to vacate his convictions on the ground that the State had failed to disclose that its sole eyewitness
had made statements indicating strong uncertainty about whether he could remember the perpetrator or identify him if he saw him again.120
The Court began its analysis by reiterating the materiality standard set
forth in Bagley.121 That is, non-disclosed evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that its use by the defendant at trial may have altered the
trial’s outcome.122 A reasonable probability does not mean that the defendant
“‘would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence,’ [it means] only that the likelihood of a different result is great enough
to ‘undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’”123 The Court further
held that “evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s
other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.”124 It did
find, however, that the suppressed evidence in this case was sufficiently strong
to undermine confidence in the verdict.125
114. Id. at 682.
115. Id. at 684. On remand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit deter-

mined that the State’s failure to disclose the impeachment evidence “unconstitutionally
interfered with Bagley’s right to a fair trial.” Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1302
(9th Cir. 1986).
116. DRESSLER & THOMAS, supra note 92, at 901. Professor Dressler is the Frank
R. Strong Chair in Law at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law and “is
one of the country’s most respected authorities on the subjects of criminal law and
criminal procedure.” Professors: Joshua Dressler, OHIO ST. UNIV. MORITZ C. OF L.,
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/faculty/professor/joshua-dressler/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).
117. Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2012).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 629–30.
121. See id. at 630.
122. Id.
123. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434
(1995)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 631.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri vacated Clemons’s convictions.126 The court held that his claim for habeas relief could proceed under
the “cause and prejudice” exception and thus his due process rights had been
violated.127 The court emphasized that this was the conclusion reached by the
special master, and that it was “supported by substantial evidence and [did] not
erroneously declare or apply the law.”128 The dissent strongly disagreed, arguing that Clemons’s habeas claim was procedurally barred and that the special
master’s recommendation and the majority’s ruling were based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Brady doctrine.129

A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court of Missouri began its analysis of Clemons’s claim for
habeas relief by noting that such relief is usually not available for a claim that
could have been raised “on direct appeal or in a post-conviction proceeding.”130
Therefore, the court had to determine whether an exception to the procedural
bar existed in this case before it could proceed to its substantive Brady analysis.131 Whether such an exception existed in this case depended on whether
“the procedural defect was caused by something external to the defense – that
is, a cause for which the defense is not responsible – and [] prejudice resulted
from the underlying error that worked to the petitioner’s actual and substantial
disadvantage.”132 The “cause and prejudice” exception would require Clemons
to demonstrate that an external cause prevented him from presenting this evidence at trial and that he was prejudiced thereby.133 Under this standard, the
basis for the claim “must not have been reasonably available to [the defense]”;
“[e]vidence that has been deliberately concealed by the state is not reasonably
available . . . .”134 The court ruled that, as Weeks’s report had been altered and
withheld from the defense, that evidence was not reasonably available, and thus
Clemons had carried his burden with respect to the “cause” prong of the exception.135 Next, the court considered whether withholding the evidence had

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

State ex rel. Clemons v. Larkins, 475 S.W.3d 60, 88–89 (Mo. 2015) (en banc).
Id. at 88.
Id.
See id. at 89 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 76 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. (quoting State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 516–17 (Mo. 2010)
(en banc)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 76–77.
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prejudiced Clemons’s defense under the second prong.136 The court determined that if Clemons could demonstrate that the State’s withholding Weeks’s
report had prejudiced him under Brady, he would have met both prongs of the
“cause and prejudice” exception to the procedural bar to habeas relief.137
The court reiterated that a successful Brady claim actually consists of
three elements: (1) the evidence is favorable to the defendant’s case because it
either is exculpatory or impeaches a prosecution witness, (2) the evidence was
withheld by the police or prosecution, and (3) the defendant was prejudiced by
the suppression in either the guilt or punishment phase of trial.138 The court
then cautioned that the defendant need not show that disclosure of the evidence
would have ultimately resulted in acquittal in order to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced by its suppression.139
The court first considered whether the evidence was favorable to
Clemons’s defense under the first Brady prong.140 It noted that the special
master had found that Weeks’s report or testimony would have been favorable
to Clemons’s defense, and that the special master’s conclusions were entitled
to significant deference.141 The court noted that while several witnesses had
testified that they observed swelling on Clemons’s face, the majority of those
witnesses had observed Clemons at least forty-eight hours after the interrogation.142 Thus, while they could attest to the existence of his injuries, their testimony left great uncertainty regarding who inflicted those injuries.143 On the
other hand, Weeks had met with Clemons only a few hours after he was
booked, making his testimony regarding Clemons’s injuries substantially better
support for Clemons’s claims that the interrogating officers had beaten him.144
Moreover, if Weeks had been allowed to testify, he would have been the only
witness without a familial or personal connection to Clemons to describe the
injuries.145
Furthermore, the court held that if Clemons had been able to rely on
Weeks’s observations at the suppression hearing, the trial court may have been

136. Id. at 78.
137. Id. at 77.
138. Id. at 78 (citing State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 338 (Mo.

2013) (en banc)).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 78, 80. The Supreme Court of Missouri has explained that a special
“master’s findings, conclusions and recommendations . . . [are] accord[ed] the weight
and deference given to trial courts in court-tried cases, in light of the master’s opportunity to view and judge the credibility of witnesses.” State ex rel. Busch by Whitson
v. Busch, 776 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Mo. 1989) (en banc).
142. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 79.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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more likely to exclude the confession as involuntary.146 While Clemons’s confession was certainly not the only evidence that the State presented at his trial,
“‘[a] confession is like no other evidence’ because it ‘is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant].’”147
At the very least, the court held, Weeks’s report or testimony could have made
the difference between a life sentence and a death sentence.148 The court concluded, therefore, that Clemons had met his burden under the first Brady
prong.149
The court then proceeded to the second Brady prong and affirmed the
special master’s conclusion that the State had failed to produce the favorable
Weeks evidence.150 Specifically, the court noted the special master’s findings
that Weeks’s notation had been crossed out and his belief that it had been done
by “someone . . . on behalf of the state.”151 It referred further to the special
master’s finding that the State had attempted to persuade Weeks to remain silent about his observation of Clemons’s injuries.152 In light of all of this evidence, and considering that the special master’s factual findings are entitled to
significant deference, the court concluded that the second Brady prong had
been satisfied as well.153
Finally, the court considered whether the State’s suppression of the
Weeks evidence had prejudiced Clemons.154 It began its inquiry by observing
that the special master found this prong to be satisfied.155 Weeks interviewed
Clemons fewer than three hours after the interrogation in which Clemons alleged he was beaten.156 Because of Weeks’s “close proximity” to the alleged
beating, and because he was a completely impartial witness, the court concluded that either his report or his testimony would have cast doubt on the voluntariness of Weeks’s confession.157 The court then called attention to the
unique and highly probative value of a confession in a criminal proceeding.158
Since Weeks’s report or testimony quite possibly could have resulted in

146. See id. at 80. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960) (noting
“that the Fourteenth Amendment is grievously breached when an involuntary confession is obtained by state officers and introduced into evidence in a criminal prosecution
which culminates in a conviction”).
147. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 80–81 (alterations in original) (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991)).
148. Id. at 81.
149. Id. at 82.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 83.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 84.
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Clemons’s confession being suppressed, the court held that Clemons had suffered substantial prejudice by its non-disclosure.159 Therefore, confidence in
the verdict had been undermined.160
In its conclusion, the court once again referred to the special master’s report.161 The special master found that the State had suppressed critical evidence and that this suppression sufficiently prejudiced Clemons’s defense to
undermine confidence in his guilty verdicts.162 The court held that these findings were “supported by substantial evidence and [did] not erroneously declare
or apply the law.”163 Consequently, the court “adopt[ed] the master’s recommendation, and vacat[ed] Mr. Clemons’ convictions.”164

B. Judge Wilson’s Dissent
Judge Paul Wilson took issue with the special master’s conclusion that
disclosure of the Weeks evidence “may have resulted” in a different verdict.
He argued that vacating a defendant’s convictions is only appropriate under
Brady if there is a reasonable probability that disclosure “would have” resulted
in a different verdict.165 Furthermore, the dissent pointed to language in the
report indicating the special master’s skepticism that disclosure of the Weeks
evidence would have affected the outcome of the case considering the strength
of the State’s other inculpatory evidence.166 He stated that Brady does not require reversal of the defendant’s convictions “when the case against the defendant remains overwhelming, even when viewed in light of the undisclosed
evidence.”167 The dissent argued that the special master had misapplied Brady
and its progeny.168 The special master found it reasonably probable that disclosure of the Weeks evidence would have resulted in suppression of
Clemons’s confession and argued that this alone warranted reversal of his convictions.169 The special master did not, the dissent contended, base his decision
on a reasonable probability that disclosure of the Weeks evidence would have
affected the outcome of Clemons’s case.170 Because Judge Wilson believed
that the special master had misapplied the law, he argued that the appropriate

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289

(1999)).
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. Id.
169. See id. (“It is enough if there is a reasonable probability of a different result. .
. . I believe Clemons has satisfied that standard.”).
170. Id.
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remedy was to remand the case to the special master to address that question,
rather than to vacate Clemons’s convictions.171
The dissent then argued that the suppression of the Weeks evidence did
not satisfy the “cause and prejudice” test necessary to overcome the procedural
bar to Clemons’s claim for habeas relief.172 As stated above, in order to show
cause under this exception, the defendant must demonstrate that the allegedly
suppressed evidence was not reasonably available to the defense.173 The dissent argued that Clemons could not carry his burden under this prong because
Weeks had mentioned the swelling on Clemons’s face during their interview.174 Thus, Clemons knew that Weeks could testify concerning his injuries
and thereby corroborate his claim that the police extracted his confession by
means of physical abuse.175 As the “prejudice” element for habeas relief
(within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim) is identical to
the materiality determination under Brady, the dissent found that even if
Clemons could show that the Weeks evidence was unavailable to him, he still
would not be able to demonstrate that prejudice.176
The dissent expressed strong skepticism that the Weeks evidence would
have resulted in suppression of Clemons’s confession.177 But even if it would
have, the dissent argued, that failure alone would not have sufficiently prejudiced Clemons’s case to allow him to overcome the procedural bar to his habeas claim.178 This is because the State’s other evidence was so overwhelming
that it simply did not need Clemons’s confession to procure his conviction.179
Judge Wilson concluded that even if the admission of Clemons’s confession at
trial was error, such error was immaterial because even without the confession,
the State’s other evidence was strong enough to support Clemons’s convictions
171. Id. at 91.
172. See id. at 104. The Supreme Court of Missouri has held that habeas relief is

“the last judicial inquiry into the validity of a criminal conviction.” State ex rel. Woodworth v. Denney, 396 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Mo. 2013) (en banc) (quoting State ex rel.
Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Mo. 2010) (en banc)), modified (Jan. 29,
2013). It is not, however, “a substitute for post-conviction relief claims cognizable on
direct appeal or in Rule 29.15 motions.” Id. Thus, to proceed with a habeas claim that
should have been raised on direct appeal, the defendant must demonstrate the presence
of an extraordinary circumstance, such as his “actual innocence” or (as in this case) that
he has satisfied the requirements for the “cause and prejudice” exception. Id.
173. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 104 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 104–06. Judge Wilson essentially argued that since Clemons knew who
Weeks was, and he knew that Weeks had noticed his injuries, Clemons’s counsel could
have presumably located Weeks and his report through reasonable diligence. Id. at
105–06. Thus, the Weeks evidence was practically available to Clemons and his counsel before and during his trial, and the evidence was therefore not “undisclosed” under
Brady. See id. at 104.
176. Id. at 107–08.
177. See id. at 108–13.
178. See id. at 113, 122.
179. Id. at 119–20.
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and sentences.180 Specifically, the dissent argued that the most damning evidence against Clemons consisted of the testimony provided by Cummins
(Clemons’s alleged victim) and Winfrey (Clemons’s alleged accomplice).181
Judge Wilson opined that the testimony of those witnesses, and not Clemons’s
confession, constituted the “lynchpin” of the State’s case against Clemons.182
In light of what it deemed to be overwhelming evidence against Clemons, the
dissent therefore declared that “Clemons should not be given relief because
there is no reasonable probability that – without Clemons’ statement – the jury
would not have convicted him or sentenced him to death.”183

V. COMMENT
The majority’s decision in Clemons is flawed in a number of respects.
The court held that the State had failed to disclose the Weeks evidence,184 but
it was undisputed that Weeks’s report and testimony were readily available to
Clemons and his attorneys because Weeks asked Clemons personally about the
swelling on his face while he was preparing his report.185 The court held that
the State’s failure to disclose Weeks’s report had prejudiced Clemons under
Brady,186 but this holding is unsupportable. While it is certainly true that
Clemons may have been able to convince the trial judge to exclude his confession had he presented the Weeks evidence at his suppression hearing, that possibility is not sufficient to warrant vacating his sentences. Rather, vacatur is
only warranted under Brady where “nondisclosure was so serious that there is
a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a
different verdict” or a different sentence.187 No such reasonable probability
existed in Clemons’s case because, as the special master himself suggested, the
strength of the State’s other evidence remained overwhelming, even absent
Clemons’s confession. Furthermore, the Clemons majority erred in adopting
the special master’s recommendation after concluding that it did not “erroneously declare or apply the law.”188 To the contrary, as the dissent persuasively
argued, the special master’s recommendation was premised on a fundamental
misapplication of the Brady doctrine.

180. Id. Judge Wilson is essentially making a harmless error argument – the undisclosed evidence was not “material” under Brady, and therefore the State’s failure to
disclose it is “harmless” because Clemons suffered no prejudice through its suppression. See id. at 122–23. According to Judge Wilson, vacatur of Clemons’s convictions
or sentences was therefore not warranted under the harmless error doctrine. See id.
181. Id. at 117–19.
182. Id. at 119.
183. Id. at 123.
184. Id. at 82 (majority opinion).
185. Id. at 105–06 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 88 (majority opinion).
187. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
188. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 86.
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A. Brady and Prosecutorial or Police Misconduct
As mentioned above, the investigation of the Chain of Rocks murders
produced multiple allegations of police misconduct. Clemons and Gray both
alleged that police had extorted their inculpatory statements through intimidation and physical abuse.189 Cummins, who was cleared of any wrongdoing,
similarly complained that police had beaten him in the interrogation room.190
The police further “mischaracterized” Cummins’s statements in an obvious effort to inculpate him.191 Finally, Weeks alleged that the police had altered the
notation he had made in his pretrial release form regarding Clemons’s injury,
and that even the prosecutor had pressured him to keep quiet about his observations.192 In short, Weeks put it very mildly when he commented that “there[
was] something weird going on” in the investigation of the Chain of Rocks
murders.193
It is important to note at the outset that, despite these instances of flagrant
police and prosecutorial misconduct, Clemons must still demonstrate that he
suffered Brady prejudice to justify vacating his sentences. The Brady Court
made clear that the doctrine is not a tool for punishing and deterring police and
prosecutorial misconduct.194 Rather, the Brady analysis is the same, “irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”195 Its primary purpose
is the “avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.”196 Under Brady, the defendant has only endured an unfair trial in violation of his due process rights
where the undisclosed evidence is “material either to guilt or to punishment.”197

B. Brady’s Applicability in Suppression Hearings
The dissent assumed for the sake of argument that Brady applies to suppression hearings.198 But the Supreme Court has not addressed this issue
squarely. While the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on this issue, the
lower courts have generally found that the Brady analysis should apply where
the undisclosed evidence could potentially have altered the result of a defendant’s motion to suppress.199 But as the dissent argued, even if Brady does apply
189. Id. at 69.
190. Id. at 67. See also id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (detailing the settlement

paid to Cummins by the City of St. Louis for allegations of assault by police officers
with the intent of obtaining a false confession).
191. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 74–75.
193. Id. at 75.
194. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 107 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
199. See Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding
“that the suppression of material information can violate due process under Brady if it
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where the undisclosed evidence allegedly would have been favorable to an accused on his motion to suppress, the defendant must satisfy a two-prong test to
procure a reversal of his convictions – “the inmate must show both: (1) a reasonable probability that the undisclosed evidence would have altered the outcome of the suppression hearing; and (2) a reasonable probability that the suppression of the evidence would have altered the outcome of the trial on the
question of guilt or punishment.”200
The dissent argued that neither prong had been satisfied.201 Judge Wilson
reasoned that “there is no reasonable probability that the disclosure of Weeks’
evidence would have changed this ruling because the trial court made its decision on the basis of the officers’ and Clemons’ credibility, not on the strength
(or weakness) of the corroborating witnesses . . . . Weeks’ evidence sheds no
light on this . . . .”202 This argument does not seem particularly compelling.
The trial judge at Clemons’s suppression hearing denied his pretrial motion
because Clemons presented “no ‘credible evidence to show how he got [his]
injuries if, in fact, he got them.’”203 As the majority opinion notes, Weeks’s
report and testimony would have made Clemons’s claim of police brutality
substantially more credible.204 The special master found that Weeks had interviewed Clemons “less than three hours” after Clemons alleged that he was
beaten by the officers.205 Furthermore, had Weeks testified at the suppression
hearing, he would have been the only witness to corroborate Clemons’s claim
who had no connection to Clemons and therefore no motive “to fabricate his
observations.”206
It is, of course, possible that the judge still would have denied Clemons’s
motion to suppress his own confession. However, Weeks, an entirely disinterested witness, could have testified that he observed a large bump on Clemons’s
face very shortly after Clemons alleged he was beaten. Weeks’s report or testimony thus would have provided exactly the sort of credible evidence that the
judge found was lacking when he denied Clemons’s motion to suppress. The
dissent’s argument that there was no reasonable probability that the Weeks evidence would have affected the outcome of the suppression hearing is therefore
unpersuasive.

affects the success of a defendant’s pretrial suppression motion”); United States v.
Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The suppression of material evidence helpful to the accused, whether at trial or on a motion to suppress, violates due
process if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”).
200. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 107 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (citing McNary v. Lemke,
708 F.3d 905, 916–17 (7th Cir. 2013)).
201. Id. at 108.
202. Id. at 109.
203. Id. (alteration in original).
204. Id. at 82 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 79.
206. Id.
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C. The Weeks Evidence Would Not Have Altered the Outcome of
Clemons’s Trial
As mentioned, three requirements must be met to justify overturning a
defendant’s convictions on Brady grounds: “The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused . . . ; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.”207
While there is some question about whether disclosure of the Weeks evidence
would have altered the result of the suppression hearing, it seems even less
likely that it would or should have affected the outcome of his trial. This appears to be the dissent’s primary argument.208 Indeed, despite recommending
that Clemons’s convictions be overturned, the special master himself expressed
serious doubts about whether suppression of his inculpatory statements would
have affected the jury’s verdict.209
A Brady violation only warrants vacatur of the defendant’s convictions
or sentences where the violation “undermines confidence in the outcome of the
[defendant’s] trial.”210 Thus, even a serious Brady violation will not require
vacatur if the State’s other evidence is sufficiently strong to sustain the defendant’s convictions and sentences.211 As the majority asserted, “[A] confession
is like no other evidence” because it “is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against [a defendant].”212 Furthermore:
In our criminal justice system as it has developed, suppression hearings
often are as important as the trial which may follow. The government’s
case may turn upon the confession or other evidence that the defendant
seeks to suppress, and the trial court’s ruling on such evidence may
determine the outcome of the case.213

But the State’s evidence against Clemons was not limited to his confession. The other inculpatory evidence was sufficiently strong that it seems
highly doubtful that Clemons was prejudiced within the meaning of Brady,
even if the Weeks evidence would have caused the trial court to suppress his
confession. Specifically, as the dissent argued, the true lynchpin of the case

207. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999).
208. See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 120–23 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 122 (“I am dubious that the suppression of Clemons’ statement would

have made much difference in this case, due to the strength of the evidence against
him.”).
210. Id. at 83 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
678 (1985)).
211. See id. at 91 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 80–81 (majority opinion) (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279,
296 (1991)).
213. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 n.1 (1979) (emphasis added).
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against Clemons was the testimony provided by the two eyewitnesses – Cummins and Winfrey.214
Both witnesses testified, saying that Clemons had raped the Kerry sisters,
that he had encouraged others in the group to rape the Kerry sisters, that he
had, at the very least, been complicit in shoving the cousins off the bridge, and
that he had later bragged about the crime.215 Clemons’s audiotaped confession
merely reiterated the testimonies of Cummins and Gray.216 The majority
stressed that “Clemons’ confession [was] the only direct evidence placing
[him] on the platform” where the Kerry sisters were shoved into the river.217
But as the dissent made clear, the State did not need that evidentiary fact in
order to convict Clemons of first degree murder under the law of accomplice
liability.218 In fact, Marlin Gray, one of the four alleged perpetrators, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, even though he was not on the bridge
when the cousins were shoved into the river.219
As the Supreme Court has held, a defendant can demonstrate a Brady violation sufficient to overturn his conviction or sentence “by showing that the
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.”220 Thus, although
the State failed to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, this is not a sufficient reason to vacate his conviction or sentence. As the dissent argued, even
without his own audiotaped confession, the evidence against Clemons remained overwhelming.221 The special master himself expressed serious doubt
that suppression of Clemons’s confession would have affected the jury’s verdicts at all.222 Thus, there was no reasonable probability that Clemons’s trial
would have resulted in a different result if his confession had been suppressed.
Even if Clemons’s confession were involuntary and thus improperly admitted
at trial, the State’s other evidence was sufficiently strong that its erroneous admission could not reasonably “undermine confidence in the outcome” of his
trial.223

214. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 119 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 120–23.
216. Compare id. at 67–68 (majority opinion) (summarizing Clemons’s audiotaped

confession), with id. at 118–19 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (summarizing the testimony of
Cummins and Winfrey).
217. Id. at 85 (majority opinion).
218. See id. at 121 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
219. Id.
220. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).
221. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 123 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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D. The Weeks Evidence Was Known to Clemons
As both the majority and dissent discussed, Clemons was required to
show “cause and prejudice” to justify bringing his belated Brady claim.224 As
set forth above, the cause element “requires ‘a showing that the factual or legal
basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel or that some interference by officials made compliance impracticable.’”225 But as the dissent illustrates, the Weeks evidence was reasonably available to Clemons. Weeks’s
name was disclosed to Clemons’s defense counsel.226 But most importantly,
Clemons himself knew of Weeks’s existence and knew that Weeks could have
provided him with favorable testimony.227 This is because Weeks interviewed
Clemons personally, noticed the swelling on Clemons’s face, and “mentioned
the apparent swelling to Clemons when the two were sitting face-to-face that
morning of April 8, 1991.”228 The Weeks evidence was thus more than “reasonably available to” Clemons’s counsel; it was known by Clemons himself.229
Because Clemons could not show cause as to why he did not bring his Brady
claim sooner, he should not have been allowed to circumvent the procedural
bar to his claim for habeas relief.
Furthermore, even if Clemons’s habeas claim were not procedurally
barred, the Weeks evidence was still available to him and his counsel, which is
fatal to his Brady claim. Federal courts have held that “[t]he rule of Brady is
limited to the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to
the prosecution but unknown to the defense.”230 It therefore does not apply
where, as here, the defendant was fully aware of the favorable evidence.
Clemons’s Brady claim should have failed for the same reason that his “cause
and prejudice” claim should have failed – he knew that Weeks had observed a
bruise on his face shortly after his interrogation because Weeks specifically
asked him about the bruise during their interview. For that reason, Clemons
should not have been able to “profit [] from information that he knew about
long before trial and that his lawyers could have pursued (but did not pursue)
more than 20 years ago.”231

224. See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 76; id. at 93 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 104 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

488 (1986)).
226. Id. at 105.
227. See id.
228. Id.
229. See id. at 94, 105–06.
230. See, e.g., Nassar v. Sissel, 792 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)
(citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)).
231. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 105 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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E. The Special Master Misapplied the Brady Doctrine
Perhaps most importantly, the dissent argued that the special master’s recommendation was erroneous because he had apparently misunderstood the law
set forth by Brady and its progeny.232 First, the special master concluded that,
had Clemons made use of the evidence at the pretrial hearing, Weeks’s report
or testimony “may have resulted” in the trial court suppressing his confession.233 As the dissent contends, “This is insufficient.”234 As set forth above,
if the Brady analysis applies to suppression hearings, the defendant must show
both a reasonable probability that the result of the suppression hearing would
have been different and a reasonable probability that the result of the trial
would have been different.235 That the result of the suppression hearing “may
have been different” does not warrant reversal of the defendant’s convictions.236 In Agurs, the Court rejected the idea that prejudice is shown by “[t]he
mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the
defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial.”237
Additionally, as the dissent pointed out, the special master did not find it
reasonably probable that the result of the trial would have been different had
the trial judge suppressed Clemons’s confession.238 In fact, the special master
declined to address this question altogether.239 The special master stated in his
report:
The state has suggested that harmless error would protect the jury verdict, even if Clemons’ confession had been suppressed. It seems to me
that the State’s argument is contrary to Kyles v. Whitley[,] . . . where the
Supreme Court held that once a violation of Brady and its progeny is
shown, “there is no need for further harmless-error review.”240

The dissent argued persuasively that the special master’s application of
Kyles reflected a crucial misunderstanding of that case.241 The special master’s
conclusion suggests that where evidence favorable to the accused has been suppressed, the reviewing court’s inquiry is complete.242 It must reverse the defendant’s convictions without examining whether the undisclosed evidence
would have affected the outcome of the proceeding.243 But as the dissent made
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 91, 113.
Id. at 90.
Id. (citing Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999)).
See id. at 89.
See id. at 90.
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109–10 (1976).
See Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 90 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 90, 113.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
Id. at 91, 113.
Id. at 90.
See id.
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clear, “Kyles is not the roadblock to common sense that the Master thought (or
was told) it is.”244 Kyles does not prohibit the reviewing court from determining what effect, if any, the undisclosed evidence would have had on the jury’s
verdicts – “[t]hat is the opposite of what Kyles holds.”245 Kyles affirmed the
Court’s prior Brady jurisprudence by holding that a Brady violation only occurs where the absence of the withheld evidence had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”246 This requirement
necessarily contemplates that reviewing courts will have to determine what impact admission of the undisclosed evidence would have had on the jury’s decision in light of the State’s other evidence.
The special master’s misunderstanding of Kyles prevented him from basing his recommendation on the probable impact that omission of the Weeks
evidence had on the outcome of Clemons’s trial. But had he thought himself
free to answer this question, he strongly suggested that his conclusion would
have been the same as the dissent’s. That is, the prosecution’s alleged nondisclosure of the Weeks evidence was “harmless” due to the overwhelming
strength of the State’s other evidence. Because the special master’s recommendation was based on a clear misconstruction of the Supreme Court’s holding in Kyles, the court should not have ordered that Clemons receive a new
trial. Rather, it should have sent the case back to the special master with instructions that he determine whether Clemons actually suffered Brady prejudice through non-disclosure of the Weeks evidence.

VI. CONCLUSION
As Judge Wilson stated in the conclusion of his dissent, we “do not know
whether Clemons was beaten to compel him to give” his confession.247
Weeks’s report and statements, coupled with Cummins’s and Gray’s substantially similar allegations, seem to provide strong support for Clemons’s claim.
But Brady and its progeny make clear that gross misconduct by agents of the
State does not justify vacatur of a criminal defendant’s convictions. That drastic remedy is only available where the undisclosed evidence was so significant
that the State’s suppression resulted in a verdict unworthy of confidence. Here,
the State’s “suppression” of the Weeks evidence did not produce that result.
Even without his confession, the State’s evidence was more than sufficient to
sustain his convictions and sentences. The court’s decision in Clemons reflects
a crucial misunderstanding of the Brady doctrine. It presents a dangerously
244. Id. at 113.
245. See id. at 114.
246. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (quoting Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281
(1999) (stating “there is never a real ‘Brady violation’ unless the nondisclosure was so
serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have
produced a different verdict”).
247. Clemons, 475 S.W.3d at 123 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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watered down version of Brady’s “materiality” requirement. It allows criminal
defendants whose convictions are supported by overwhelming evidence to succeed in having those convictions overturned. Clemons sets a dangerous precedent in Missouri – one that the Supreme Court of the United States has condemned over and over again through its Brady jurisprudence.
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